Research on how hardware imperfections impact security has primarily focused on side-channel leakage mechanisms produced by power consumption, electromagnetic emanations, acoustic vibrations, and optical emissions. However, with the proliferation of sensors in security-critical devices, the impact of attacks on sensor-to-microcontroller and microcontroller-toactuator interfaces using the same channels is starting to become more than an academic curiosity. These out-of-band signal injection attacks target connections which transform physical quantities to analog properties and fundamentally cannot be authenticated, posing previously unexplored security risks. This paper contains the first survey of such out-of-band signal injection attacks, with a focus on unifying their terminology, and identifying commonalities in their causes and effects. The taxonomy presented contains a chronological, evolutionary, and thematic view of out-of-band signal injection attacks which highlights the cross-influences that exist and underscores the need for a common language irrespective of the method of injection. By placing attack and defense mechanisms in the wider context of their dual counterparts of side-channel leakage and electromagnetic interference, our paper identifies common threads and gaps that can help guide and inform future research. Overall, the ever-increasing reliance on sensors embedded in everyday commodity devices necessitates that a stronger focus be placed on improving the security of such systems against outof-band signal injection attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of algorithms which have mathematically been proven to be secure can often be circumvented in practice due to a mismatch between the system model used for security analysis and the real-world environment on which an algorithm runs. Oftentimes, this mismatch is due to imperfections in the physical hardware constructions used, and hardware security research thus far has primarily focused on how these imperfections cause information leakage. The variability in how long different operations take, as well as deviations in their power consumption, and data-dependent electromagnetic, optical, and acoustic emanations result in side-channels which can be used to recover the data being processed by a device. Few works, however, have focused on the reverse question of how to inject signals into systems in a similar out-of-band fashion: even research on fault injection attacks has primarily focused on recovering cryptographic keys [8] , [60] , [152] , with only a handful of papers using fault injection attacks to alter memory contents and bypass logic protection mechanisms [152] .
In recent years, more emphasis has been placed on signal injection attacks whose aim is to alter the values reported by sensors converting physical properties into electrical ones. The best-known example is perhaps Foo Kune et al.'s seminal paper on Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) signal injection attacks [43] , which demonstrated that the leads of cardiac implantable electrical devices and the wires connecting microphones to microcontrollers can act as unintentional receiving antennas. These antennas pick up attacker-injected low-power signals which are interpreted by the system as legitimate sensor readings, leading to pacing inhibition and defibrillation. Since then, more research on electromagnetic [123] , [129] , optical [97] , [151] , and acoustic [14] , [132] , [154] injections has surfaced, targeting devices from drones [132] , [142] to hard drives [14] and cameras [100] . Such attacks have also attracted the interest of technological and mainstream news publications outside of the academic community [19] , [32] , [46] , [75] , [86] , [146] and form the focus of this paper.
A. Scope
This paper is concerned with out-of-band signal injection attacks that target the link between analog sensors/actuators and microcontrollers, and are defined precisely in Section II. As such, environmental attacks which change the measured quantity itself (e.g., by heating a temperature sensor) are out-of-scope. Similarly, insecure protocols between digital interfaces which are intended for communication and jamming attacks are not considered, even if the application domains are similar to the ones mentioned above. For example, spoofing the tire pressure of car wheels and triggering warning lights [115] , altering the flow of insulin injections [70] , changing pacemaker settings to deliver shock commands [55] , over-powering legitimate GPS signals [153] , or jamming train signal controls [67] are not considered in this survey because they attack unauthenticated, digital communication interfaces through wireless transmissions. For similar reasons, relay attacks on LiDARs [100] , [127] , [151] and other types of radars [29] , [151] which spoof the distance between the attacker and the victim are out-of-scope, as they depend on winning a race between the adversarial signal and the true reflected pulses.
B. Contributions & Organization
Despite the growing literature in the area and extensive parallels between out-of-band signal injection attacks/defenses and prior work in hardware security research, there is no comprehensive survey making these connections explicit or arXiv:1901.06935v1 [cs.CR] 21 Jan 2019 Terminology Example References Intentional Interference [9] , [10] , [14] , [43] , [61] , [73] , [94] , [132] Spoofing [97] , [100] , [143] , [151] Non-Linearity [116] , [117] , [150] , [154] Injection [43] , [49] , [61] , [74] , [93] , [94] , [142] , [143] Other (See Text) [44] , [123] , [126] tracing their evolution through time, theme, or approach. This paper fills this gap through the following contributions: 1) It unifies the diverse terminology used by different works (Section II) and summarizes the threat model (Section III) to create a common language through which to discuss attack and defense mechanisms. 2) It proposes the first chronological and thematic evolution of out-of-band signal injection attacks (Section VIII), which highlights cross-influences between electromagnetic (Section IV), conducted (Section V), acoustic (Section VI), and other (Section VII) attacks. 3) It creates a taxonomy of countermeasures suggested to prevent and detect out-of-band attacks (Section IX). 4) It places attacks and defenses in the wider context of side-channel leakage and electromagnetic interference attacks (Section X). Using these insights, this paper identifies gaps in the experimental approach of published research, and proposes concrete steps to overcome these challenges in the future (Section XI).
II. TERMINOLOGY
Despite numerous acoustic, electromagnetic, and optical attacks on sensor-to-microcontroller and microcontroller-toactuator interfaces, many inconsistent (and sometimes conflicting) terms have been used to describe them: Table I contains a summary of the terminology used in literature along with some example references. This section sets out to unify the nomenclature as a first step towards providing a common language through which to compare the various works. As the threat model (Section III) and the causes of vulnerability (Section VIII) reveal, the commonalities in the attack techniques highlight a need for an all-encompassing term irrespective of the method of injection. We therefore first present some common threads identified in the literature and explain why certain terms are not suitable, for instance due to a clash in terminology with established research areas. We then define and motivate our choice of the term out-of-band signal injection attacks that is used throughout this paper.
One of the earliest terms used to describe the attacks in question was (intentional) interference, primarily in the context of electromagnetic attacks [9] , [10] , [43] , [61] , [73] , [94] , and with sparse use of the term for acoustic attacks [14] , [132] . This term was avoided in this work because (a) it does not make it clear that the attacker can in some cases inject waveforms of his/her choosing; and (b) Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) has an established meaning in Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) literature [105] , [120] , dealing with high-power and often disruptive/destructive attacks on digital systems. For similar reasons, methodologyinspired terms such as Radio Frequency Injection (RFI), Direct Power Injection (DPI) and other terminology that arises in immunity or susceptibility prediction literature against (nonadversarial) electromagnetic interference (EMI) [5] , [6] , [15] - [17] , [45] , [47] , [48] , [62] , [103] , [137] have also been avoided.
Another recurring term that has been used extensively to describe these adversarial attacks is (sensor) spoofing [97] , [100] , [143] , [151] . This term, however, was also avoided in this paper for multiple reasons: first, spoofing has an overloaded meaning in an authentication context, and with inband signal injection attacks [34] , [129] and can thus lead to confusion; second, the term does not capture the physical aspect of the attack; and third, the term does not accurately describe more coarse-grained attacks which lead to saturation rather than a more precise signal injection.
Although some works do not name the attacks in question [107] , [148] , others propose terms that are specific to the particular channel which is being exploited, including induction attacks [123] , acoustic resonance [126] and (acoustic) non-linearity [116] , [117] , [154] . Such terms were rejected because they are channel-specific, and focus on the mechanism of the attack, rather than the effect. Finally, the term transduction attacks, proposed in [44] to mean attacks which "exploit a vulnerability in the physics of a sensor to manipulate its output or induce intentional errors" has not received mainstream recognition and also does not necessarily make it clear that the attack may target the interface between the sensor and the rest of the system instead of the sensor itself.
By contrast, the term injection has been consistently used in a few works [10] , [20] , [43] , [49] , [61] , [73] , [74] , [76] , [93] , [94] , [142] , [143] , [154] , with a further subdivision proposed in [127] , [128] : regular-channel attacks, which target the sensor structure itself by "using the same type of physical quantity sensed", transmission-channel attacks, which target the connection between the sensor output and the measurement setup, and side-channel attacks, where the sensors themselves are targeted, but "by physical stimuli other than those they are supposed to sense". We do not adopt this categorization, as it generally follows the medium of injection (optical, electromagnetic, and acoustic respectively), and may also lead to confusion: regular-channel attacks are usually in-band, while side-channel attacks have an overloaded meaning.
Instead, to distinguish the attacks studied in this survey from signal injection attacks on sensors using pulse reflections such as LiDARs [100] , [127] , [151] , signal injection attacks on the physical layer of communication protocols [59] , and false data injection attacks [67] , [71] , we propose the modifier out-of-band to specify that the interfaces attacked were not anticipating signals in the frequency bands targeted. This term is in line the definition for out-of-band covert communication, which utlizes channels "traditionally not used for communication" [26] . In fact, the term out-of-band signal injections was also recently used in [143] for acoustic attacks on inertial sensors, further motivating its choice. To summarize:
Definition 1 (Out-of-Band Signal Injection Attacks). Out-ofband signal injection attacks are adversarial manipulations of interfaces not intended for communication involving sensors/actuators that cause a mismatch between the true physical property being measured/acted upon and its digitized version.
It should be noted that the majority of attacks in the literature are on sensors rather than actuators, but similar principles generally apply. As a result, we will refer to both of them collectively as sensors for brevity, and will distinguish between the two when it is necessary to do so.
III. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
Systems depend on sensors and actuators to interface with their external environment, and require a conversion of a physical property (e.g., temperature or speed) to or from an electrical quantity (such as voltage or resistance). This electrical measurement is typically analog in nature, and is digitized by an Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) before it is processed. Although modern cryptography has mostly solved the problem of secure communication between digital interfaces, there is no way to authenticate the measurement itself or the analog component of the actuator/sensor-tomicrocontroller connection. This lack of authentication, coupled with hardware imperfections, is what out-of-band signal injection attacks exploit. Although the high-level system model separates the sensor from the ADC and the microcontroller, all three functions may be fully integrated into the same chip. Even then, systems remain vulnerable to out-of-band signal injection attacks: for example, acoustic attacks targeting the resonant frequencies of gyroscopes and accelerometers are successful even when the integrated circuit output is digital [132] , [142] , [143] .
The threat model for out-of-band signal injections precludes physical access to the system under attack, and does not allow attackers to manipulate the property being measured itself (e.g., the radiation being measured by a Geiger counter): in the language of [130] , attacks are non-invasive, and the property measured itself is trusted. Nonetheless, attackers are allowed to transmit signals outside of the limits being sensed, which are still interpreted as valid measurements. For example, an attacker can produce ultrasound waves which are picked up by a microphone recording human speech [116] , [117] , [154] , or shine infrared (IR) light into a camera capturing the visible part of the spectrum [100] . 1 However, attacking a microphone with audible sound or a camera with visible light would not be allowed under this threat model, since the attacker would be manipulating the property being sensed itself (as the signal injection would then be in-band). 2 Figure 1 presents the channels that have successfully been exploited in the literature thus far for out-of-band signal injection attacks. Some of the attacks use electromagnetic (EM) waves to target the connection between the sensor 1 These attacks may therefore still require proximity to the target device. Section XI contains further details on distance and other considerations. 2 A secondary goal for some attacks is undetectability or concealment [130] . Fig. 1 : System model for out-of-band signal injection attacks. Adversarial electromagnetic emanations, optical emissions, and acoustic waves can attack the sensors themselves, or the interfaces connecting sensors to microcontrollers through Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADCs). and the microcontroller (Section IV) or the power circuit of the device (Section V). Others target the sensors themselves through sound (Section VI), or other means such as infrared light (Section VII). In general, the vulnerability of systems to out-of-band signal injection attacks therefore depends on (a) how adversarial signals are received by the devices under attack (e.g., EM signals can be picked up by PCB traces); and (b) how these signals are then digitized. Giechaskiel et al. [49] recently proposed a general circuit model which uses two transfer functions to separate these two aspects of vulnerability, and introduced mathematical security definitions under this model to describe how "close" the demodulated injected signal is to the target waveform. The model restricted the adversary through peak voltage only, as distance, shielding, and other considerations could be addressed through an attenuation factor in the circuit-specific transfer function. The threat model and experimental work in [49] highlighted the demodulating effects of ADCs as the primary cause for concern, with the components that influence its demodulation characteristics shown in Figure 2 .
Specifically, all ADCs contain a level-comparison mechanism, which is typically an amplifier [98] . However, amplifiers have non-linear distortions such as harmonics which result in "spectral components at multiples of the fundamental frequency", as well as intermodulation products at integer sums and differences of transmitted frequencies [110] . Moreover, the input to the ADC typically contains reverse-biased diodes to protect the circuit from Electrostatic Discharge (ESD). When the input voltage is negative, or when it exceeds the maximum allowed voltage, the diodes tie it to ground or V cc respectively, causing a (non-linear) DC shift [110] , which attackers can also exploit. These non-linearities can produce meaningful low-frequency waveforms out of signals modulated over highfrequency carriers, which are often necessary to enter the targeted circuit [43] , [49] . It should be noted that although every ADC contains a sample-or track-and-hold circuit [98] which acts as a low-pass filter, in practice, its cutoff frequency "is often much higher than the sampling rate of the ADC" [49] . This low-pass filtering behavior counteracts the aliasing effect, which occurs when signals are faster than half the sampling rate of the ADC (Nyquist frequency), and can also result in high-frequency signals being indistinguishable from lowfrequency ones.
Overall, imperfections in the sensors themselves, the ADCs, or the connections between them can result in high-frequency signals being interpreted as meaningful low-frequency ones, allowing remote attackers without physical access to inject signals into a system in an out-of-band fashion. The subsequent sections discuss these imperfections in greater detail, with a focus on the specific method of injection.
IV. ELECTROMAGNETIC ATTACKS
Electromagnetic attacks target the links between sensors and microcontrollers, which act as unintentional receiving antennas. 3 These antennas can pick up ambient and intentional electromagnetic (EM) radiation, which is then interpreted as legitimate sensor readings. As the systems targeted are not intended for communication, this phenomenon is known as back-door coupling [22] , [43] , [50] , [91] , [149] , where the "radiation couples through imperfections (apertures) in an electromagnetic shield, giving rise to a diffuse and complex field pattern within the shielded structure" [22] . Predicting the susceptibility of systems against back-door coupling is a hard task "without detailed testing, although properties averaged over frequency bands can be predicted" [11] . Specifically, although the resonant behavior of simple geometric structures (e.g., lines and rectangles) has been extensively studied [104] , and mathematical formulas have been developed for how EM fields couple to Printed Circuit Board (PCB) traces [69] , when non-linear components such as diodes are included, extensive experiments are necessary to identify the extent to which intermodulation products appear in the output [149] . Such intermodulation products can act as potential envelope detectors causing systems to take the wrong safety-critical actions [43] , demonstrating that these coupling effects are a concern for more than just compliance with Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) regulations.
Indeed, there is extensive literature on the electromagnetic interference (EMI) of various systems on implantable medical devices (IMDs) [7] , [21] , [30] , [33] , [39] , [56] , [58] , [68] , [84] , [85] , [101] , [102] , [122] , some of which has even pinpointed the demodulating properties of "non-linear circuit elements" in pacemakers on "modulated RF signals" produced by cell phones as the culprit for the interference [7] , [28] . However, the consequences of intentional out-of-band electromagnetic signal injection attacks were only first identified in 2009 for IMDs by Rasmussen et al. in the context of a distancebounding protocol [107] .
Specifically, the proposed protocol based guarantees on ultrasound transmissions, but it was determined that an EM signal could "induce a current in the audio receiver circuit just as if the IMD received a sound signal" [107] . This would allow an attacker to break protocol properties based on assumptions around the speed of propagation by operating from a longer distance than would be possible using sound waves. This attack is perhaps the first out-of-band electromagnetic signal injection, since it utilized EM emanations to attack an ultrasound-based protocol, and relied on wires "from the reception circuit to the piezo element" working as unintentional antennas. However, it was not until 2013 and the seminal work by Foo Kune et al. where adversarial injections became the focal point of research. Specifically, it was shown that such adversarial emissions could affect Electrocardiogram (ECG) measurements and cause IMDs to deliver fatal defibrillation shocks [43] . Injecting arbitrary analog measurements for the first time in literature proved to be a significant improvement compared to coarse replay and jamming/DoS attacks on IMDs [51] , [55] , [70] , [118] , or high-power Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) leading to the transient upset or destruction of commercial equipment [18] , [22] , [37] , [50] , [57] , [91] , [92] , [95] , [105] , [119] . In this particular instance, the baseband (i.e., the frequency of operation) was attacked directly through intentional, low-power, low-frequency (kHz range) EM Interference (EMI) signals, and thus did not make use of the non-linearities identified above and in Section III.
In most cases, though, signals need to be modulated over high-frequency carriers to make use of unintentional antennas. This was also shown in practice in [43] when targeting webcams and bluetooth headsets by transmitting signals modulated at the devices' resonant frequencies (in the hundreds of MHz). Non-linearities demodulated the input signals and resulted in intelligible audio output [43] . By contrast, [61] triggered voice commands in smartphones by emitting AM-modulated signals that get picked up by the user's hands-free headset. This was considered a case of front-door coupling, as the "radiation couples to equipment intended to communicate or interact with the external environment" [22] : headphones are used as FM antennas and can thus not be effectively shielded. It should be noted that the field strength required was in the order of 25 − 30 V m −1 , close to the limit for human safety, and an order of magnitude higher than the required immunity level (3 V m −1 ), illustrating that high powers might still be required for reasonable attack distances: in a subsequent work, the authors noted that their attack requires a power of 200 W for a distance of 4 m [73] .
The magnetic component of EM transmissions had largely been ignored until recently. The first work investigating it is in-band: Shoukry et al. demonstrated that it is possible to spoof Anti-Lock Braking Systems (ABS) by exposing the magneticbased wheel speed sensors to an attacker-generated magnetic field [129] . By modeling the true signal as a disturbance and the spoofing signal as the reference signal, the feedback controller is forced to accept the spoofing signal as the real one and alter the measured speeds, veering cars off the road.
More recently, Selvaraj et al. proposed an analytical model of electromagnetic induction attacks using Faraday's law, with a focus on the magnetic rather than the electric field [123] . The same work conducted experiments against General Purpose Input/Output (GPIO) pins of microcontrollers in both analog and digital modes, and showed that many frequencies between 0 − 1000 MHz resulted in a DC offset at distances of 10 − 100 cm. This indicates that there an adversary can successfully inject signals over a wide range of frequencies, even without having precisely determined the resonance behavior of the system. In addition, [123] was the first paper to attack an actuator through EM transmissions, resulting in one-way rotations of a Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) servo. How to extend the range of the attack, and how to more precisely control the servo in both directions remain open problems.
Selvaraj et al. were only concerned with the average power received and not time-dependent signals, which would use subcarrier frequencies and depend on inter-modulation products and harmonics. This is in contrast to work on the demodulating effects of amplifiers, discussed in Section V below. Instead, the researchers suggested that the ESD diodes were the culprits causing a DC offset due to clipping, but it was not clear whether the methodology followed could be used to induce attacker-desired, time-varying waveforms through modulated (in amplitude or otherwise) transmissions: in the language of [49] , Selvaraj et al. performed an existential injection which disturbs the ADC readings, but not a selective injection of attacker-chosen waveforms, unlike the earlier work of [43] .
V. CONDUCTED ATTACKS
A different class of out-of-band signal injection attacks requires an indirect physical connection between the attacker and the victim, such as a shared power line. Unlike their radiated counterparts of Section IV, these conducted attacks do not require signals to be picked up by unintentional receiving antennas in the path between sensors and microcontrollers. Instead, signals are propagated along conductors primarily on the powering circuit, which can transfer over to paths containing non-linearities through crosstalk or ground plane capacitive coupling. This propagation of electrical disturbances through structures [96] and cables is studied in Transmission-Line Theory [88] , [89] , and through the Baum-Liu-Tesche (BLT) equation [53] , [140] , [141] .
Out-of-band conducted signal injection attacks have been primarily experimental in nature, and have been inspired, in part, by the extensive literature trying to predict the susceptibility of microcontrollers, ADCs, and other embedded systems in response to high-frequency radio signals injected into I/O and power pins. The goal of such research is to quantify immunity to radiated and conducted EM disturbances, and is typically concerned with the average power received by the embedded system, like [123] summarized in Section IV.
To avoid legal and practical considerations related to electromagnetic transmissions, the experimental approach followed is known as Direct Power Injection (DPI), and consists of injecting harmonic disturbances from a few kHz to a couple of GHz and measuring the relationship between forward power and frequency. Multiple works have shown that as the frequency of the input increases, immunity to DPI also increases [5] , [6] , [15] , [47] , [62] , [66] . 4 In other words, higher frequencies generally require higher forward power injections for the same level of susceptibility. A similar methodology can be applied to evaluate the demodulation characteristics of amplifiers and transistors [45] , [48] , [103] , [137] , and therefore better predict the fidelity with which attackers can inject target waveforms, both in the conducted and the radiated setting. This was recently done in [49] for different types of ADCs with a view on how to exploit this demodulating effect for out-of-band signal injection attacks.
Having characterized the behavior of individual components, one should identify vulnerable paths that can transfer the attacker-injected signals into the system. For example, Lopes Esteves and Kasmi recently successfully injected Google Now commands into a smartphone by exploiting the fact that the phone's microphone IC was physically close to its USB charging port on the device's PCB [73] . As a result, backdoor coupling occurred, either due to "a re-radiation of the interference from the USB circuitry bypassing the physical isolation by parasitic coupling (crosstalk) or the possible sharing of the Vcc and GND networks on the PCB" [73] .
The methodology used was inspired by experiments on the propagation of conducted disturbances and on EM injections into power cables. Specifically, it was determined that EM coupling into the USB cable as well as a malicious peripheral on the shared power line can both cause the smartphone to demodulate transmitted commands at 200 − 250 MHz. The attack was successful at distances up to 10 m with only a 0.5 W source, even when the phone was charging through the USB port of a computer, and not directly through a wall adaptor. Such conducted attacks therefore significantly lower the power requirements and increase the injection distance compared to the same authors' remote EM attack of [61] .
It is also possible to attack True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) which are based on Ring Oscillators (ROs) through signal injection attacks. ROs are constructs which consist of an odd number of logical NOT gates chained together in a ring formation, where the input of the first gate is the output of the last gate. The value between any two stages of the RO oscillates between true and false, thus forming a bi-stable loop. There are many parameters that affect the frequency of oscillation, including the number of stages in the RO, and the delay between stages, which are influenced by small variations in the manufacturing process, voltage, and temperature (PVT) [54] . By XORing several ring oscillators together, one can exploit the randomness of the phase jitter to create a TRNG [136] . However, due to the frequency dependence on voltage, a signal of suitable frequency can lead to frequency locking of the oscillators [2] , [80] , removing the differences in the randomness of the jitter [74] .
Markettos and Moore first showed in 2009 that frequency injections into the power supply of the ring oscillator circuits can induce this locking, and thereby bias the TRNG, causing it to fail statistical tests of randomness [74] . Even a constant (DC) power supply voltage can lead to locking of ring oscillators, as there is a "dependence of the frequency of one oscillator on the current peaks caused by rising and falling edges of the second oscillator" [13] . It should be noted that although under-/over-power attacks are usually considered fault attacks, in this case the ring oscillators are still functioning properly, but the entropy of the TRNG is reduced due to less jitter present [24] , [76] . Moreover, although the above attacks alter the power supply directly, the same outcome can be achieved through EM emanations in close proximity to the chip under attack [9] , [10] , [20] (targeting the wires connecting the various stages of the ROs directly), or through EM emissions into the cable powering the device [94] . As the work by Osuka et al. [94] places itself in the space of (non-destructive) IEMI attacks, we expect that future work will be concerned with conducted frequency injection attacks over shared powerlines similar to [73] , bridging the two areas of research.
VI. ACOUSTIC ATTACKS
Research into out-of-band acoustic signal injection attacks has primarily focused on (a) attacking electro-mechanical devices by causing vibrations at their resonant frequencies; and (b) causing microphones to pick up inaudible sounds. In the former category, Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) gyroscopes and accelerometers have been a popular target. MEMS gyroscopes "use vibrating mechanical elements to sense rotation" [4] , through the inertial Coriolis force [1] . In other words, MEMS gyroscopes contain oscillating structures which, when rotated, appear to have a measurable force exerted on them. For this reason, MEMS gyroscopes include mechanical resonators which convert electrical signals "into a force that sustains the drive resonant mode" [4] . These "drivemode oscillators generate and maintain a constant linear or angular momentum", so that "when the gyroscope is subjected to an angular rotation, a sinusoidal Coriolis force at the frequency of drive-mode oscillation is induced in the sense direction" [1] . This force is exerted in a different direction from the moving direction, and is measured by an accelerometer.
The existence of this resonant frequency was shown to degrade performance in response to high-power acoustic noise [27] , [35] , [36] , but the security effects of intentional sound transmissions were not explored until 2015 by Son et al. [132] . Initially, the effect was a simple denial-of-service (DoS) attack on drones caused by the transmission of single-tone frequencies sound waves at the resonant frequency of their gyroscopes, and there was no control over the drones' movements. Proofof-concept coarse-grained control was then first demonstrated in a Black Hat conference presentation against gyroscopes in virtual reality (VR) headsets and self-balancing vehicles [148] . Tu et al. then became the first academic paper to control gyroscopes in a much more fine-grained fashion, and for longer periods of attack (up to the minute range) [143] . The key insight was to account for drifts in the sampling rate of the ADC which are amplified when the injected signal is beyond the ADC's Nyquist rate. This is done by altering the center frequency and phase of transmission: the first attack presented "proportionally amplifies the induced output in the target direction and attenuates the output in the opposite direction" (Side-Swing), while the second one controls "the induced output by manipulating the phase of the digital signal with repetitive phase pacing" [143] .
Although attacks against gyroscopes in [143] result in adversarial control of phones, scooters, stabilizers, screwdrivers, and VR headsets among others, only DoS attacks were successful against accelerometers. MEMS accelerometers operate on a different principle: they consist of spring-mass systems, and acceleration results in a deflection of the seismic mass, which "is detected by means of capacitive elements, the capacitances of which change with deflection, or by piezoresistive elements that detect strain induced by the motion of the seismic mass through a change in resistor values" [65] . Acoustic vibrations at the resonant frequencies of the spring-mass systems also displace the suspended mass, and insecure amplifiers and low-pass filters (LPFs) prior to the accelerometer ADCs can demodulate attacker-transmitted signals [142] . These insecurities are the results of clipping non-linearities and permissive filtering respectively, and allow for both biasing and outputcontrol attacks, some cases in all 3 axes. Trippel et al. showed that both Amplitude Modulation (AM) and Phase Modulation (PM) can be used to control remote-controlled (RC) cars or register fake steps on fitness tracking wristbands, like those made by Fitbit [142] , but the duration of control over the output of the MEMS sensors was short-lived due to sampling rate drifts. Finally, Nashimoto et al. recently explored how to simultaneously attack accelerometers, gyroscopes, and magnetometers whose outputs are fused together using a Kalman Filter to improve the robustness of measurements [93] . It was shown that "while sensor fusion introduces a certain degree of attack resilience, it remains susceptible to attacks" which combine acoustic and electromagnetic injections [93] .
In a different strand of research, 10 years after a video by a then-employee of Sun Microsystems showing that shouting in a data center causes unusually high disk I/O latency [52] , Shahrad et al. showed that acoustic transmissions can cause vibrations in Hard-Disk Drives (HDDs) [126] . These vibrations result in read and write errors and make systems unresponsive, even leading to Blue Screen of Death (BSOD) errors [126] . Although [126] primarily focused on the effect of the angle of transmission, research conducted in parallel more precisely pinpointed the root cause of the issue using Finite Element Analysis [14] . Specifically, it was shown that (audible) acoustic waves "can displace a read/write head or disk platter outside of operational bounds, inducing throughput loss", even though the displacement is of only a few nanometers [14] . In addition, [14] also attacked the shock sensors which are meant to protect HDDs during sudden drops by "parking the read/write head" through ultrasonic transmissions. These shock sensors found in modern HDDs consist of MEMS accelerometers, and are therefore also vulnerable to malicious signal injections at their resonant frequencies. Through these malicious acoustic attacks, HDDs become unresponsive, and thus disable systems that depend on them, such as laptops and video recorders.
Not all acoustic attacks transmit at resonant frequencies. By contrast, other research targets microphone non-linearities to cause inaudible sound to be recorded. Early in-band work focused primarily on adversarial attacks against machine learning in speech recognition systems [25] , [144] , but later work revolved around ensuring that the transmitted frequencies are beyond the human-audible range (20 kHz). This was first accomplished in [154] , which caused speech recognition systems such as Apple Siri, Google Now, Microsoft Cortana, and Amazon Alexa to interpret (modulated) ultrasound transmissions as valid commands due to microphone and amplifier nonlinearities (Section III). Similar research was in progress at Princeton [133] , but the proof-of-concept injection of inaudible voice commands to an Amazon Echo remains a pre-print.
In parallel, [116] also used inaudible ultrasound transmissions to record audible sounds, proposing a high-bandwidth covert channel. Although covert channels are not discussed in this survey, [116] did not simply apply prior work in a new context, but contained a novel idea regarding what hardware imperfections to exploit. Specifically, instead of using amplitude modulation over a single frequency like in [154] , Roy et al. simultaneously played two ultrasound tones whose shadows create audible sounds (only sensed by microphones) due to non-linearities. The paper showed that amplitude modulation could not be used due to non-linearities in the ultrasound transmitters themselves which would result in audible signals. Instead, further pre-computation was required to remove the "ringing effect", where "the transmitted sound becomes slightly audible even with FM modulation" [116] .
Indeed, "increasing the transmit power at the speaker triggers non-linearities at the speaker's own diaphragm and amplifier, resulting in an audible" output [117] , and therefore one cannot increase the distance of the attack using a single speaker. Instead, multiple speakers in the form of an ultrasonic speaker array can be used to attack voice recognition systems including Amazon Alexa and Google Now even at a distance of up to 7.6 m (25 ft) [117] . The attack works by partitioning the audio spectrum across the various speakers in a way that "reduces the audible leakage from any given speaker" while minimizing the total leakage power [117] , thus preventing any of the non-linearities (and the transmitted signal itself) from being audible. It should be noted that if multiple noncooperating ultrasonic sources are emitting simultaneously, intermodulation distortions can create audible byproducts: such ultrasonic interference was identified as a potential source of "strange metallic sounds" heard by diplomats in Cuba [150] .
VII. OTHER ATTACKS
Although electromagnetic, conducted, and acoustic attacks form the majority of out-of-band signal injection attacks, there has been some research on optical attacks, as well as temperature-based attacks which bias RO-based TRNGs. In the former category, attacks exploit permissive filtering and poor shielding in interfaces which only expect ambient environmental conditions. Most attacks have targeted sensors in an in-band fashion, including attacks on LiDARs and other forms of radars [100] , [127] , [151] , as well as visible-light attacks on cameras in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) [34] and cars [100] , [151] , making them out-of-scope. Researchers have also hypothesized that excessive light injections would blind car cameras and confuse auto-controls in automated vehicles [99] , and limited success has been achieved using Ultraviolet (UV) and Infrared (IR) lasers up to 2 m away [100] . However, attacks were only possible in dark environments, and the results were not reproducible with invisible lasers against other makes and models of CMOS cameras [151] .
In a different strand of research, Park et al. further showed that some medical infusion pumps are not well-protected against adversarial optical injections [97] . Specifically, in order to measure the flow rate of the medicine being administered, pumps are fitted with drip measurement sensors, which consist of an IR emitter and receiver facing each other. When a drop passes through the sensor, the IR receiver temporarily senses less light due to diffusion, allowing for the rate to be measured. However, because the sensor is not well-enclosed/shielded, an adversary can shine an infrared laser into the sensor, causing these drops to be undetected, thereby blinding/saturating the sensor. By then un-blinding the sensor, the attackers can also trick the firmware into detecting fake drops, and bypass alarms. The attackers would therefore be able to both overand under-infuse a patient for an extended period of time and for a variety of normal flow volumes, but with only coarsegrained control over the real flow rate. It should be noted that as the sensor was not meant to receive external stimuli, this attack should be considered to be out-of-band. Most of the experiments in [97] were conducted at a distance of 10 cm, but success was reported up to 12 m away. These results show that optical attacks can reach meaningful distances, but are, of course, limited by line-of-sight considerations.
The final class of attacks exploits the dependence of ring oscillators on temperature to reduce the entropy of the TRNG, and is mentioned here for completeness, as the distance requirements would dictate physical access to the device under attack. Specifically, early proof-of-concept work predating the Markettos and Moore paper [74] showed that statistical randomness tests of RO-based TRNGs would fail for certain FPGA temperatures [131] . More detailed experimentation was then conducted by a separate research group in 2011, using different heat-transfer methods (resistor heater, Peltier Fig. 3 : Evolutionary and thematic taxonomy of out-of-band signal injection attacks, categorized by topic and methodology. Direct and indirect influences between out-of-band signal injections and some key related works are also shown. Highly influential papers are discussed more extensively in Section VIII.
cooler, and liquid nitrogen), and showed that "the hotter the temperature, the larger the bias" [134] . Martín et al. [76] also investigated the effect of temperature across multiple different TNRG designs based on Self-Time Rings (STRs), which do not exhibit the frequency locking effects discussed above [31] . It was shown that unlike RO-based TRNGs, the effects of temperature increases on the randomness of STRbased TRNGs were not significant, due to a combination of a decrease in frequency and an increase in jitter due to thermal noise [76] . It should be noted that although these attacks might be considered fault attacks, since devices were operating within their temperature specifications, we could consider them as out-of-band, biasing signal injection attacks which operate at limited distances. This is in contrast to, for example, [77] which investigates the entropy of TRNGs in response to ionizing radiation. Overall, although optical and thermal signal injections lead to potentially interesting attacks, their efficacy so far has been limited.
VIII. TAXONOMY OF ATTACKS
This section presents a taxonomy of out-of-band signal injection attacks, tracing their evolution through time and topic, and identifying commonalities in their methodology and source of vulnerability. Figure 3 presents the direct and indirect thematic and evolutionary cross-influences between the various types of attacks, as well as non-attack papers which have inspired them or have been inspired by them. For example, research on acoustic signal injection attacks [116] , [117] , [154] has been influenced by inaudible commands which exploit voice recognition algorithms (instead of the non-linearity of microphones) [25] , [144] , and have also inspired work in intermodulation in relation to a source of metallic sound heard in Cuba by diplomats [150] . The graph also shows that there are many cross-topic and cross-method influences from inband/other types of attacks to out-of-band signal injections, between out-of-band signal injections, and from out-of-band injections back into other types of attacks. For example, [72] proposes IEMI attacks on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and is influenced by both in-band optical attacks on UAVs and out-of-band acoustic attacks on MEMS sensors.
Due to limited space, it has not been possible to include every source of influence by non-attack papers. For instance, although papers about demodulating non-linearities in pacemaker amplifiers [7] , [28] influenced Foo Kune et al.'s work [43] , they have not been included in the figure, but were discussed in Section IV. In addition, to reduce the number of arrows in the graph (and hence clutter), the figure assumes the transitive property: if a paper X is influenced (or merely cited) by papers Y and Z, and Y is influenced (cited) by Z, then no direct arrow from Z to X is included. Figure 3 also highlights a few papers which in the opinion of the authors have played a central role in the development of the field, as evidenced both by the number of citations (> 85) for papers before 2017, and the novelty and potential of the ideas contained in more recent ones. Specifically, [74] Year Paper Method Effect Resonance ( †) Non-Linearity denotes a theoretical or partially-realized attack. Resonance ( †) includes frequency locking for ring oscillators, and unintentional wire antennas for EM attacks. and [10] were chosen because they were the first to bias RObased TRNGs in the conducted and EM setting respectively, going beyond earlier theoretical work on oscillator locking [2] , [79] . Similarly, [43] successfully exploited non-linearities and unintentional antennas in remote electromagnetic injection attacks, which were non-adversarial in prior work (e.g., [56] , [58] ) or only mentioned in passing [107] .
In terms of acoustic attacks, [154] has been very influential already, 5 and was the first to exploit microphone nonlinearities for signal injections (rather than covert communication as in [116] ). Three papers on MEMS sensors have also contained significant insights: Son et al. first showed how to disrupt gyroscopes [132] , while Trippel et al. controlled the output of accelerometers for short periods of time [142] . Tu et al. more recently showed how to extend the duration of control [143] , and was thus also included in this list, as the technique proposed can be applied for other attack channels. In addition, although the research on HDD attacks in [126] was conducted first, [14] was highlighted in Figure 3 for its insights and analysis of why resonant attacks against hard drives work, and its use of acoustic attacks against shock sensors built into modern HDDs. Finally, although the ABS attack by Shoukry et al. [129] is in-band, it has been highlighted not only for its high citation count (> 100), but because it is the first EM paper to focus on the magnetic field and has inspired research in out-of-band magnetic attacks [93] , [123] . Table II also summarizes the various out-of-band signal injection attacks along with factors which contribute to them, as identified by their respective authors. Almost all attacks except for those which target microphones and optical sensors depend on some sort of resonance: this can be acoustic resonance of mechanical structures, electromagnetic resonant frequencies of unintentional antennas, or the existence of locking frequencies for ring oscillators. Other common factors identified include the non-linearity of amplifiers and microphones/speakers, improper filtering, poor shielding, and insecure sampling and processing algorithms that do not help detect or prevent the out-of-band attacks. These sources of vulnerability form the basis for many of the proposed countermeasures of Section IX.
IX. COUNTERMEASURES
This section summarizes defense mechanisms proposed specifically for out-of-band signal injections (Section IX-A), as well as other more general countermeasures which can be applied in this context (Section IX-B).
A. Out-of-Band Defense Mechanisms
Although some of the attack papers offer no solutions to the vulnerabilities exploited [10] , [20] , [24] , [116] , many do suggest both prevention and detection techniques. Most papers suggest more than one method, as none of them are perfect, and some incur additional monetary and computational costs. The proposed countermeasures can be broadly categorized as follows, and are summarized in Table III : Robust Hardware: In response to the resonance and nonlinearity vulnerabilities of Table II , different papers have proposed preventive improvements in the hardware itself to make it more robust and less susceptible to attacks. For example, Markettos and Moore recommend reducing the asymmetries in the ring oscillators through "carefully balanced transistors", or the use of differential ones, which are "less affected by supply and substrate noise" [74] . Similarly, since SSDs are not vulnerable to resonance attacks, they can be used instead of HDDs without being susceptible to acoustic attacks [14] , [126] . In addition, the use of differential rather than singleended comparators [43] , [132] removes the common-mode voltage of injected signals, attenuating it by up to 30 dB. Although signals can still be injected, the power requirements to do so increase significantly, thereby raising the bar for attackers. Finally, better frontends with fewer non-linearities are less sensitive to EMI noise [49] , [61] 
and sonic injections
Year Paper Method Robust Hardware Better Sampling Sensor Fusion Improved Filtering
More Shielding Anomaly Detection Software Challenges Table II .
[142], [148] , [154] , making it even harder for the attacker to inject his/her desired signal into the system. Such designs are discussed in greater detail in Section IX-B. Better Sampling: Many papers have proposed improvements in the sampling technique to make it harder for an adversary to predict how a high-frequency signal will be converted to a low-frequency one. In 2015 Shoukry et al. proposed an alternative method of sampling active sensors called PyCRA to detect signal injection attacks [130] . Active sensors "perform some action to evoke and measure a physical response from some measurable entity" (e.g., magnetic encoders measuring angular velocity), and the proposal revolves around physical challenges to prove the absence of adversarial transmissions. Specifically, when the sensor is off (silenced), there should be no measured quantity unless an attack is taking place. By only shutting down the sensor for a small period of time, PyCRA can detect attackers, since they hit a physical and computational delay limit preventing them from also stopping transmissions [130] . 6 An alternative approach to influence signal injection attacks into sensors is to ensure that attackers cannot inject precise waveforms by adding randomness to the sampling process, especially for ADCs which are only vulnerable for limited carrier frequencies [49] . The effect is essentially one of "having an inaccurate ADC" [142] , allowing a moving average to filter out injected periodic signals.
This is similar to sampling with a "dynamic sample rate", which defeats the side-swing and switching attacks of [143] explained in Section VI. Finally, out-of-phase sampling has been proposed as a band-stop filter to reject frequencies near an accelerometer's resonant frequency, thereby removing attacker-injected DC offsets [142] . It should be noted that protecting against signal injection attacks into actuators has not been studied as extensively in literature. However, [87] recently proposed a detection method based on a watermarking scheme that slightly alters the actuation parameters. Under attack, the measured response of the system does not match the effect of the watermark, allowing detection. An alternative approach proposed in the same paper is to pseudo-randomly change the pulse frequency of the PWM signals, making an actuator attack harder to accomplish. Overall, these methods only alter the shape of the waveform that an adversary can inject rather than the root cause of the vulnerability itself, and are therefore not sufficient countermeasures by themselves. Sensor Fusion: A few works have suggested that using multiple sensors of the same type (duplication) with different vulnerabilities (e.g., resonance frequencies) or sensors of different types (fusion) will make injections harder, as an adversary would need to mount multiple simultaneous attacks [14] , [100] , [128] , [143] , [148] . Some researchers have also proposed that additional sensors can be used to measure and counteract attacker signals. For example, [132] suggested "using an additional gyroscope with a special structure that responds only to the resonant frequency", while [14] , [148] recommended noise cancelling of resonant sounds through an extra microphone. It should be noted, however, that for hard drives cancelling "over an area large enough such that the read/write head is completely enveloped as it moves across the disk" and creating a sound wave of sufficient amplitude would be hard in practice [14] . Overall, the effectiveness, cost, and complexity of such schemes remain open questions for future research, especially since [93] showed that existing fusion techniques are susceptible to attack (Section VI).
Filtering & Shielding: Quite a few papers have highlighted the need for better filters to reduce the vulnerable frequency range against conducted [49] , [73] , [74] , EM [43] , [49] , [94] , [123] , acoustic [142] , [143] , and optical attacks [100] . In addition, better shielding from the environment also improves protection against out-of-band signal injection attacks. This shielding may come in the form of physical isolation [97] , [126] , [132] , [143] , better acoustic dampening materials [14] , [142] , [143] , [148] , or radio frequency shielding [43] , [49] , [61] , [74] , [94] , [107] , [123] , [128] . For instance, a 40 dB attenuation of the injected signal was achieved using a low-pass filter, and the same attenuation was possible "even with large imperfections" when shielding the webcams [43] . However, shielding is not always possible or effective: for example, "while a light sensor can function in a mesh-based Faraday cage, magnetic shielding would prevent light from reaching the sensor" [123] . In addition, [14] showed that dampening foam "significantly reduced an HDD's susceptibility to write blocking", but "did not attenuate lower frequency signals".
Finally, the foam lead to an increased temperature of 10 • C, which can also result in disk failure. Anomaly Detection & Software Challenges: Instead of trying to prevent signal injection attacks, some works have proposed anomaly detection, with or without additional hardware. One approach is to estimate the ambient level of electromagnetic [43] , [61] , optical [97] and acoustic [14] , [117] , [126] , [148] , [154] emissions. For example, "by checking whether the light intensity exceeds the preset maximum level" saturation attacks can be detected [97] , while [43] suggests that one can measure the levels of EMI radiation through a metric for signal contamination. Although these works do not propose mitigation mechanisms, [14] suggests to augment the hard drive feed-back controller to compensate for the intentional acoustic interference, thereby reducing the error of the read and write head. Another way of detecting attacks is to look for artifacts that would not be present during the normal operation of a sensor, such as harmonics and high frequency components [49] , [117] , [154] . This might not be as straightforward as simply detecting energy at low or high frequencies that are only present due to non-linearities: for sophisticated attackers, defense mechanisms need to exploit the properties of the legitimate signal itself. For example, [117] shows that "voice signals exhibit well-understood patterns of fundamental frequencies", which are not present in attacks and environmental noise. Similarly, the absolute refractory period (the time span after a contraction during which the cardiac tissue will not contract again) is hard for an attacker to spoof precisely via EM injections [43] , and can be used to distinguish between a real and a forged signal. Finally, Kasmi and Lopes Estevez have suggested voice authentication and custom keywords to prevent generic attacks from resulting in successful command injections [61] , [73] . Although this can reduce the impact of the injections on voice command interfaces, this solution only prevents the attack in some cases, and cannot be used in the context of other attack scenarios.
B. Other Defense Mechanisms
As out-of-band signal injection attacks are closely connected with different areas of research (Section X), there is some overlap between defense mechanisms from related work and those discussed above. For example, [34] , [127] , [151] all propose sensor fusion and anomaly detection as a way to mitigate in-band sensor spoofing attacks. In fact, detecting unique features of the sensed property is a common defense mechanism for general sensor manipulation attacks, for instance for automatic generation control of power [135] , or for unmanned aircraft systems [87] , but they require a theoretical model of the system and an adversary who cannot inject data obeying this model. Similar to [61] , [73] , Carlini et al. has also proposed audio CAPTCHAs, speaker recognition, and the addition of noise through randomized sampling as a way of preventing command injection attacks from being successful [25] . Finally, hardware which is more robust to environmental influences should also reduce susceptibility to out-of-band signal injection attacks. For example, Redouté and Richelli have proposed some guidelines for improving immunity against EM interference attacks [108] , [109] which could be applied in the context of general out-of-band attacks: 1) Filter induced signals before the nonlinear device. This suggestion is not limited to amplifiers, but can be used in other setups, including power transistors [23] . It has been shown to result in an up to a 12.5× reduction in EMI-induced offsets [83] , [108] , [147] , but may require bulky passive components, adding noise to the circuit. 2) Linearize the stage generating the DC shift. For example, [121] proposed an amplifier with a wider common mode input range, resulting in better linear behavior. 3) Prevent the accumulation of DC shift, for instance by addressing the slew rate asymmetry and parasitic capacitances [42] , [82] , [112] . 4) Compensate and remove the induced offset, for example, using cross-connected differential pairs [42] . As discussing all possible EMI-resistant amplifier designs is out-of-scope, the interested reader should refer to [82] , [111] , [145] as a starting point. Similarly, one should refer to [4] , [124] , [125] for advances in gyroscopic technologies which either do not use MEMS constructions, or which reduce sensitivity to random vibrations and make systems more secure against out-of-band acoustic attacks.
X. OTHER RELATED WORK
As this paper contains the first survey of out-of-band signal injection attacks, this section shows the close connections with side-channel leakage and electromagnetic interference. For example, using insights into the resonant frequencies of gyroscopes in [132] , Farshteindiker et al. showed that unprivileged websites could act as covert channel receivers, even at very low sampling frequencies of 20 Hz [41] . Block et al. improved the design by not requiring external equipment for the attack, instead relying on the smartphone's speaker and accelerometer [12] , while Matyunin et al. used the same effect for cross-device tracking using ultrasonic transmissions at or near the resonant frequencies of gyroscopes [78] . Moreover, Michalevsky et al. showed that MEMS gyroscope measurements are sensitive to acoustic signals in their vicinity, and can be used to distinguish between different speakers, and, in part, the content of the speech [81] due to conducted vibrations of the loudspeakers used [3] . In other words, the same source of vulnerability which can be used to destabilize [132] and control [142] , [143] , [148] gyroscopes and accelerometers can be used for covert channel communication [12] , [41] , tracking [78] and speaker identification [3] , [81] .
Observation 1: The sources of vulnerabilities for outof-band signal injection attacks can often be applied for covert-and side-channel attacks and vice versa.
The countermeasures proposed in the papers above mirror those of Section IX-A, and also include anti-aliasing filters, acoustic damping/shielding, and sensor fusion. Moreover, suggestions to increase noise in side-and regular-channel emis-sions parallel out-of-band defense mechanisms based on reducing the sampling accuracy, such as decreasing "the fidelity of the input audio" [25] to prevent against inaudible voice injection attacks. As an example, Tempest fonts [64] , [138] , [139] exploit the fact that EM emanations of video display units mostly convey "the high-frequency part of the video signal", while human eyes are more sensitive to "low spatial frequencies" [64] . This mismatch allows for the transformation of images in a way that is almost transparent to human viewers, but prevents the reconstruction from side-channel listeners. Similarly, researchers have shown that adding certain patterns to video frames [155] or the flashing of LED lights [156] can reduce the fidelity of reconstructed images from camera recordings, while not influencing regular viewers as much.
Observation 2: In some cases, the same defense mechanisms are applicable to out-of-band, covert-, and side-channel attacks with few to no modifications.
The lines between electromagnetic interference and out-ofband signal injection attacks are also blurred, in part because the self-classification of attacks depends primarily on the research community with which an author is aligned, rather than the end result of the injection. For example, the voice injection command attacks of [61] , [73] are categorized by their authors as IEMI attacks, despite the lack of upsets or destruction of equipment. Similarly, [94] is also considered an IEMI attack by its authors, even though it biases the randomness of a TRNG. This mismatch of expectations often results in unexplored avenues of research, as can be seen, for example in the IEMI attacks on UAVs of [72] : although there is a strong inverse correlation between the battery temperature reading and the strength of the electric field, the authors do not further investigate how to precisely control the sensor output. Moreover, as was explained in Section IX-B, research into electromagnetic interference (EMI) can provide insights into how to build more resilient hardware, even when the hardware is only tested against "unintentional parasitic signals and does not take a malicious behavior of an attacker into account" [73] .
Observation 3: The proposed terminology based on the outcome rather than the method of injection can help systematize attack and defense approaches.
XI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Although a lot of research is being conducted in the area, there is no way to directly evaluate the efficacy of out-of-band attacks and defenses. In fact, unlike side-channel analysis [63] , direct power injection and near-field scan immunity [16] , fault injection attacks [152] , and IEMI attacks [90] , there is no common methodology for evaluating the susceptibility to outof-band signal injection attacks. Indeed, although many papers sweep through frequencies to find the resonant ones [43] , [142] , some do not use this terminology [14] , [126] , [132] , and do not specify how wide the frequency steps should be. This proves to be particularly problematic, as some attack windows "are as narrow as a few Hertz" [126] .
Recently, Tu et al. [143] provided a more detailed methodology for acoustic injection attacks, which starts with a profiling stage, through the transmission of single-tone sounds, swept at an interval of 10 Hz, and aimed at stationary devices. Further increments of 1 Hz or smaller can be used near the resonant frequencies to estimate the sampling frequency of the ADC, and account for its drift. The later stages involve synchronizing to a frequency which is close to a multiple of the ADC sampling rate, followed by manipulating the attack parameters, and adjusting them in response to drifts. Although this is a good first step in providing a common ground for the evaluation of some setups, several questions remain unanswered, especially when evaluating countermeasures and claiming that a system is not vulnerable. These questions include what the frequency range itself should be, what the step should be for wide ranges, what modulation method to use and with what parameters, and whether there are other factors that would need to be examined during experimentation. For instance, for electromagnetic attacks, the incident angle of the EM field and the distance of attacks can have a profound impact on their success, especially as they relate to generalizing from the near-to the far-field.
Observation 4: A precise experimental procedure which specifies sweep, modulation, and other parameters is needed for out-of-band signal injection attacks.
The question of maximum feasible distance for attacks has mostly been of theoretical interest, with practical attacks often limited to a few centimeters. For example, although [43] claims that a 20 dB gain directional antenna and a 1 W source can attack equipment at distances of up to 50 m, these estimates seem optimistic: according to [73] , a 200 W source is required for a distance of 4 m for the command injections of [61] . Similarly, [143] claims that with more speakers, gyroscopes can be attacked from an 8× longer distance, but as [117] showed, doing so is not a trivial engineering concern, if the inaudibility of injections is to be maintained.
Observation 5: Dedicated facilities and equipment for long-distance experimentation are needed.
As the currently published work often leaves experimental details under-specified, reproducibility becomes a significant challenge: for instance, [142] reported that some of the attacks only work for a couple of seconds before the attack fails due to sampling rate drifts, requiring manual tuning (some of these restrictions are overcome in [143] ). Without details into the function generator specifications, it would be hard to know whether some of the issues are related to poor clock accuracy of the generator, especially in the context of attack weaponization through Software-Defined Radio (SDR) and other low-end commodity hardware. These problems are bound to become more pronounced as minor variations in the construction of devices can have significant effects on the sensors' behavior: for instance, [38] showed that otherwise identical accelerometers can be tracked due to slightly different performance characteristics. Although [49] recently introduced security definitions to address the lack of directly comparable metrics describing the outcome of injection attacks, the overall lack of experimental details together with monetary costs and legal requirements associated with using the electromagnetic spectrum make security research into out-of-band signal injection attacks a challenging space for new researchers to enter.
Observation 6: Reproducibility through common metrics and more experimental details on the setup used is necessary to move the area forward.
In terms of how to protect future devices from attack, besides improvements on the defense mechanisms of Section IX (e.g., less vulnerable hardware, fusion algorithms built for adversarial injections, and comparisons of the various sampling techniques), new security-sensitive products must take a fundamentally different approach to trusting the outputs of sensors. In the words of Fu and Xu, there is a need to "shift from component-centric security to system-centric tolerance of untrustworthy components", perhaps taking note of advances is fault-tolerant literature [44] . Fu and Xu also recommended that sensor outputs be "continuously checkable by software for adversarial influence", such as through internal debugging information that is hidden from accessible APIs, and further highlighted the need for interdisciplinary teams and education [44] . Indeed, given that the research influences for signal injection attacks are multifaceted, many crossdisciplinary solutions will be required to prevent, detect, and mitigate attacks, which are bound to become more powerful until new hardware is deployed.
Observation 7: Comparative research which quantifies the effectiveness of different countermeasures is needed to inform future hardware choices.
XII. CONCLUSION
Our ever-increasing reliance on sensors and actuators highlights the need for a comprehensive look into electromagnetic, conducted, acoustic, and optical out-of-band signal injection attacks. These attacks cause a mismatch between a physical property being measured by a sensor or acted upon by an actuator and its digitized version, and can be used to control or disrupt drones, medical devices, and hard drives among others. In light of the importance of such attacks, this paper took the first step towards unifying the diverse and expanding research through a taxonomy of attacks, defenses, and terminology. Our work revealed inter-disciplinary influences between seemingly disparate topics, and also made several observations that can inform future research in the area. Overall, better experimental and reporting procedures are necessary for direct comparisons of the effects of attack and defense mechanisms.
